Pratibhanusarini --- 九州インド哲学ブログ2

On Indian Philosophy and Buddhist Studies

Editions of the Tantravārttika by Prof. Kunio Harikai

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  1. 2013/04/22(月) 12:10:30|
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received: George Cardona "Pāṇini’s dates and the evidence of coinage”

カルドナ先生から論文を頂きました.

パーニニがコインに言及すると一部の研究者が言っているが,そのようなことはない,というのが結論です.

パーニニが言及しているのは金とか銀といった貴金属の量(parimāṇa)に過ぎないということです.

したがって,コインへの言及を根拠にパーニニの年代を決定することはできない,というのがカルドナ先生の議論です.(ちなみに,インドの最初のコインは紀元前4世紀のGandharan Punch Marked Coins打刻印貨幣です.)

カルドナ先生自身は,別の根拠から,紀元前500年にパーニニの年代を置きます.

George Cardona
"Pāṇini’s dates and the evidence of coinage"
pp. 151-177

In:
INDOLOGICAL RESEARCH
DIFFERENT STANDPOINTS
(Erudite lectures delivered in the Department of Sanskrit Sahitya, Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, as part of the ‘Project Erudite — The Scholar in Residence’ launched by Kerala State Higher Education Council)

Editor: P. C. Muraleemadhavan
Year: 2013

Price: Rs. 150 ($ 10)

Published by
Department of Sanskrit Sahitya Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, Kalady P. O., Ernakulam Dist. Kerala State — 683574


ナイスなシュローカが引用されているので孫引き.

Ślokavārttika in Mahābhāṣya on A 5.1.19:
ūrdhvamānaṃ kilonmānaṃ parimāṇaṃ tu sarvataḥ/
āyāmas tu pramāṇaṃ syāt saṅkhyā bāhyā tu sarvataḥ//

現代日本語に訳すなら,ここでのプラマーナは「量」というよりも,「長さ」になるでしょう.
  1. 2013/04/21(日) 08:10:05|
  2. 未分類

マイティガルにて印哲新歓

九大印哲新歓0416

四人の新メンバーを迎えての新歓.

参加者は史上最多の18人でした.

マイティガルの店内も一杯一杯.

(後から来た二人のお客さんはカウンターに座れましたが,その後に来た4人は断られていました.申し訳ないでことです.)

いつものように,モモ,セクワの前菜に始まり,最後はカレー.

豆,いも,チキン,マトンなどなど,8種類ほどはいただいたでしょうか.

ご飯のおかわり続出で,クマールさんが用意したご飯15合もすぐに底をつきました.

(飢えた学生の一部は,ぱりぱり煎餅のパパドをお代りしていました.)

山口先生からは,インドのスパークリングワインのSulaの差し入れ.

しかも,巨大なマグナムボトル.

あっという間に空きました.

原田先生も,いろいろと忙しい中,駆けつけてくれました.

これからまだ仕事があるとのことで,マトンカレーを食べて,颯爽と早退.

ネパール帰りの松本さんは,ネパール料理屋で,ネパールでのひどい体験を熱く(演技付きで)語ってくれました.

新メンバーの自己紹介,旧メンバーの自己紹介に続いて,最後は,岡野先生の挨拶.

OBのチャーリーも,久々にギターを抱えての登場.

華麗に二曲ほど弾いてもらいました.

ハードワークにお疲れのクマールさんも,しばし手を休めて,聞きいっていました.

Maitighar0416
  1. 2013/04/17(水) 08:10:20|
  2. 未分類

存在論ワークショップ

龍谷存在ワークショップ 009

ティレマンス,ガーフィールド,シデリッツ,桂先生と,大御所が並ぶ中,ワークショップ開催の趣旨を説明される出口先生.

分析の八木沢先生も.

桂→シデリッツ→ガーフィールド→ティレマンスの順で,おもにアビダルマ,経量部,唯識,中観の立場をとりあげながら,哲学者を相手にトーク.

最後はインド文法学から小川先生.

会場には荒牧先生の姿も.
  1. 2013/04/14(日) 19:38:08|
  2. 未分類

トミー画伯の印哲ビラ

CopyrightTomiura2013

4月9日は,入学式,そして,その後,新入生の研究室訪問の日でした.

文学部では,(無事に単位が揃えば)2年次から研究室への配属が決まります.

一年後どの研究室に入るのがよいのか,それを知るために,入学時に研究室訪問の機会を設けています.

160人ほどの新入生が,自分の興味ある研究室を回って,先輩や先生の話を聞いて,一年後に備えるというわけです.

今年は,印哲学部生のトミー画伯に,印哲宣伝用のチラシを作成していただきました.

4日もかかったそうです.

ありがとうございました.

せっかくなので,夏の高校生向けオープンキャンパスにも使いたいと思います.

肝心の新入生研究室訪問の中身ですが,新入生ほったらかしで,ネパール旅行からちょうど帰ってきた松本さんの帰朝報告で,研究室は大いに盛り上がりました.

Nepal 5480

松本さん,トラブル続きの中でも,バクタプルの広場のカフェでまったりカフェしたとのことですが,それは,この右の建物の上にあるカフェのことでしょう.

写真は2007年9月に撮影したもの.
  1. 2013/04/12(金) 08:05:35|
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published: Nyāyakalikā

Kei KATAOKA
A Critical Edition of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyakalikā (Part 1). 『東洋文化研究所紀要』(The Memoirs of Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia), No. 163, March 2013, pp. 236(1)-184(53).

http://www2.lit.kyushu-u.ac.jp/~kkataoka/Kataoka/Kataoka2013b.pdf

HakozakiCampusSakura1
  1. 2013/04/10(水) 20:06:24|
  2. 未分類

九大印哲進学生オリ

DaimyoSagar.jpg

配属研究室が決定する2年の4月.

進学生のオリエンテーションがありました.

今年は新メンバーに,新二年生の田中君が加わりました.

また転科で新三年生の須藤君が印哲に移籍.

サンスクリットも履修済みなので,既に研究室では馴染みの顔です.

単位の取り方,研究室の図書などなど,三年生の先達からの教示を受けつつ談話.

気が付くと4:30.

というわけで,そのまま大名サーガルへ.

山口夫妻も加わって賑やかなプレ歓迎会となりました.

二次会は近くのジェラート屋の茶音へ.

貸し切り状態.

ケースのジェラート群を入念にチェックしたのちに注文.

DaimyoSaon
  1. 2013/04/04(木) 08:20:41|
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ナビさんハラルでビリヤニ

NabisanHalal.jpg

福岡でビリヤニと言えば舞鶴のザエカですが,灯台もと暗し,箱崎九大前ナビさんハラルもランチメニューにビリヤニを加えていました.
  1. 2013/04/04(木) 08:04:33|
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Exegetical Problems of Pramāṇasamuccaya I 9

Kei KATAOKA

Exegetical Problems of Pramāṇasamuccaya I 9

Following Dharmakīrti's interpretation, Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.9ab has been understood as stating a view common to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, i.e. a view that self-awareness (svasaṃvitti) is the result (phala) of a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). It has also been understood that Dignāga (in 1.8cd and 1.9) accepts two different views attributed to Sautrāntikas with regard to pramāṇaphala: in PS(V) ad 1.8cd he regards the understanding of an external object (arthādhigati) as the result; in PS(V) ad 1.9ab-cd he alternatively presents another view that self-awareness is the result. Dignāga's text, however, does not support these interpretations. Rather it contradicts them. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation forcibly tries to impose Dharmakīrti's idea on Dignāga and thus, against Jinendrabuddhi's intention, reveals itself as a totally impossible interpretation. In this way Jinendrabuddhi's commentary rather demonstrates that Dharmakīrti's interpretation is not what Dignāga originally intended. In fact Dignāga (in 1.8cd and 1.9cd) presupposes a single view, and not two, attributed to Sautrāntikas, a view that the understanding of an external object (arthādhigati) is the result. In 1.9ab (svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra) he is presenting an alternative view that is attributed only to Yogācāras, i.e. a view that is not common to Sautrāntikas.

An abstract published in Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 58, No. 3, 2010.
The original Japanese version is published in the same journal, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2009, pp. 455(106)-449(112).
See here for PDF of the original version, Kataoka 2009d.
  1. 2013/04/04(木) 05:23:36|
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Kumārila and Dharmakīrti on the potential problem of pramāṇa and phala having different objects

Kei KATAOKA

Kumārila and Dharmakīrti on the potential problem of pramāṇa and phala having different objects

According to the Sautrāntika view put forward by Dignāga in PS I 9cd, viṣayābhāsatā is the pramāṇa and bāhyārthajñāna (not svasaṃvitti) is the phala (Kataoka [2009]). Althogh the Sautrāntika sākāravāda essentially has an internal structure, Dignāga presupposes that an external object can be regarded as the object of cognition because it is similar to the (essentially internal) image of object, as is indicated in PSV 4,8 (yadā tu bāhya evārthaḥ prameyaḥ) and PSV 4,13--14 (yathā yathā hy arthākāro jñāne sanniviśate śubhāśubhāditvena, tattadrūpaḥ sa viṣayaḥ pramīyate). He assumes that the objects of pramāṇa and phala, both being an external object, are identical. Criticizing Dignāga’s claim that bāhyārthajñāna (not svasaṃvitti) is the phala, Kumārila (ŚV pratyakṣa 79cd) points out that there is a serious gap between the objects of pramāṇa and phala. Consequently Dharmakīrti has to admit that even in the Sautrāntika view an external object is not directly cognized (PV III 348b: arthātmā na dṛśyate) and instead proposes as the second view of Sautrāntikas that svasaṃvitti (and not bāhyārthajñāna) is the phala. At the same time he reinterprets Dignāga and defends from Kumārila’s criticism by introducing the two different levels. When investigating the real nature (PV III 350c: svabhāvacintāyām), i.e. in the so-called paramārtha level, svasaṃvitti is the phala, whereas in the upacāra level, bāhyārthajñāna or bāhyārthaniścaya is the phala. Thus Dharmakīrti avoids Kumārila’s criticism of Dignāga. Kumārila triggers Dharmakīrti’s new introduction of the second view of Santrāntikas that svasaṃvitti is the phala.

An abstrac published in Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 59, No. 3, 2011.
The original Japanese version is published in the same journal, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2010, pp. 418(115)-412(121).
See here for PDF of Kataoka 2010d, the Japanese version.
  1. 2013/04/04(木) 05:16:46|
  2. 未分類

svasaṃvedana and dvairūpya: Cognitive structure according to Dignāga

svasaṃvedana and dvairūpya: Cognitive structure according to Dignāga

Kei KATAOKA

Previous studies interpret PS(V) I 9cd as describing a Sautrāntika view that (intentional) self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) is the result (phala). This interpretation is not supported by the straightforward reading of the original Sanskrit text. Dignāga’s model described in PS(V) I 9d emphasizes the point that cognition of an object is objective and not subjective: an external object such as white is cognized in the same way in which it enters the cognition, namely as white. The model of svasaṃvedana and dvairūpya depicted here is incompatible with the subjective model, i.e. the view that an object is cognized in accordance with self-awareness. In order to interpret PS(V) I 9d as describing the subjective model, one has to resort to forced reinterpretations. For example, Jinendrabuddhi interprets mīyate as niścīyate, and tena as tatsādhanayā svasaṃvidā. This is also the case with the passage jñānasvasaṃvedyam api svarūpam anapekṣya, which, according to Dharmakīrti, is to be interpreted as sann api grāhakātmā. In other words, one needs to resort to interpretative devices in order to squeeze out the view that an object is subjectively cognized in accordance with self-awareness. A straightforward reading, however, suggests the opposite. There is no need for us to resort to complicated exegetical devices. One can simply interpret PS(V) I 9cd as describing the objective model, i.e. a Sautrāntika view that the cognition of an external object is the result.

Abstract published in Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 60, No. 3, March 2012.
The original Japanese version is published in the same journal, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2012, pp. 1020(105)-1013(112).
See here for PDF of Kataoka 2012d, the original Japanese version.
  1. 2013/04/04(木) 05:13:30|
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On Dignāga’s Semantics: The Role of Inference by Means of Horns

Abstract of my paper: Kataoka 2012g (See here for a PDF of the original Japanese version)
This abstract is published in Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 61, No. 3, March 2013, pp. 1315(257)-1316(258).
(The Japanese version is published in the same journal, Vol. 61, No. 1, 425(94)-419(100).)

Kei KATAOKA
On Dignāga’s Semantics: The Role of Inference by Means of Horns

p. 1315(257)
Yoshimizu recently published two articles on Dignāga’s theory of apoha. He claims that
“the word ‘cow’ excludes all horses by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen on
them.” Thus, “the word ‘cow’ can exclude all of them collectively by virtue of the fact that
none of them has all the members of the set of characteristics that form the worldly defini-
tion of ‘cow’.’’ Horns, one of the characteristic features of cows, are indeed mentioned by
Dignāga in PS(V) 5:43. But a close look at the passage reveals that here Dignāga refers to
the function of an inferential reason viṣāṇitva and not the function of a word “cow.” Dig-
nāga mentions the simple inference by means of horns. With the word yathā Dignāga in-
tends that a word “cow” communicates cow in general by excluding others, just as an in-
p. 1316(258)
ferential reason such as viṣāṇitva does. It is not the case that Dignāga refers to horns as a
basis for a word “cow” to exclude the non-cow. Yoshimizu understands Dignāga’s seman-
tics as being parallel to the modern semantics of componential analysis. But this interpreta-
tion is not supported by Dignāga’s text. The present conclusion is also supported by Mā-
dhava and Kumārila. Neither of them assumes Dignāga’s theory to be as Yoshimizu takes it.
  1. 2013/04/04(木) 05:01:22|
  2. 未分類

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