Bhāsarvajña’s interpretation of bhāva eva nāśaḥ and a related chronological problem Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic, Eli Franco, Birgit Kellner (eds), Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis. Proceedings of the Fouth International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna, August 23--27, 2005, Wien 2011, pp. 341--361.
Muroya 2011:359: If these two assumptions were the case, they would provide an indication of the following chronological sequence: first the NBhūṣ and the NKaṇ, then the AhVA, and finally the NVTṬ.
MUROYA, Yasutaka “Apropos the Nyāyasūcīnibandha: Some Historical Problems and the Manuscript Transmission of the Nyāyasūtra,” Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha 62 (2006), pp. 405–432.
Muroya 2006:23: Under this assumption, inasmuch as the printed NSN regards the relevant relationship as upodghāta, strong doubt is throuwn upon the antiquity of the work, resulting from the alleged authorship of Vācaspati Miśra I.
I mentioned in my article, Kataoka 2014a, the disputed year "898" (976 AD according to some scholars) of Vacaspati Misra I's Nyayasucinibandha, when I discussed the chronology of Sucarita Misra in relation to Vacaspati Misra I.
But probably the consideration of the year recorded in the ms colophon is not necessary, because the Nyayasucinibandha is probably not authored by Vacaspati Misra I.
Muroya 2006 casts a doubt on the authorship, basing himself on solid evidence. I am convinced by his argument.
Under the present circumstances (unless some strong evidence pops up for his authorship), we should not take it seriously that the NSN is authored by Vacaspati Misra I. Hence we do not have to worry about the disputed date recorded in the colophon of the NSN.
What we should take into consideration as the lower limit of his date is the fact that Jnanasrimitra knows Vacaspati Misra I.
I thank Dr. Muroya for his pointing out to me the relevant material.
Correction to Kataoka 2014a:352(11), line 8 (thanks to Dr. Elisa Freschi)：
na sarvo vyavahāreṇa prāmāṇyam avagacchati| pramāṇalakṣaṇaṃ tena parasparavirodhavat||219|| pratyakṣādipramāṇena paraloko na gamyate| āgamād aparaḥ prāhety ato na vyavahārataḥ||220|| tasmāt, vyavahāraparāmarśāt śāstraṃ mohanivartanam| pūrvāparasyāsmaraṇaṃ śāstreṇānena vāryate||221||
"Not everyone understand [a cognition's] validity [just] from [one's] everyday activities. [Only] by this [everyday activity, however,] the characteristic of means of valid cognition is mutually contradictory. [Therefore, one needs religious treatises for ascertaining the pramanalaksana.] (219) Other existences after death (paraloka) are not apprehended by [ordinary] means of valid cognition like perception. Thus, others claim that [such objects are known] from scripture (agama), but not from everyday activies. (220) After such consideration of everyday activities, a religious treatise removes confusion [about pramanalaksana]. Buy this religious treatise, [one's] non-recollection (i.e., delusion) about past and future [existences] is [also] removed. (220)
In this regard, Krasser (2001: 186) has pointed out that "nowhere in the Pramanasiddhi chapter is the Buddha explicitly said to be avisamvadin," and concludes that only the second characteristic is applicable to the Buddha. True, it is not explicitly stated that the Buddha is avisamvadin, and yet example  should not be overlooked, in which Dharmakirti describes the Buddha as a person who does not lie. The text of PV II 145--146a and the translation by Franco are as follows:
...........[quote of PV II 145 and tr. by Franco 1997]......
Here, the term anrta is translated as "untruth," but as Franco indicates in the subsequent square brackets, the term can also mean "lie." Thus, if we can equate anrtavacana with visamvada, the basic structure of the verse becomes clearer: The Buddha is pramana, because he ie endowed with the characteristic of pramanas, no-belying, which is equal to the proprty of his fourth epithet, the "protector" (tayin), in the sense of his revealing the path that he had experienced.